

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 288840 TOSEC 310059

64

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.  
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.  
S/S:DMACK

----- 124280

O 250223Z NOV 76 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 288840 TOSEC 310059

NODIS  
FOR SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, IS, LE

SUBJECT: PAPER ON SOUTHERN LEBANON

THE FOLLOWING PAPER WAS DELIVERED TO LARRY EAGLEBURGER BY  
DINITZ LATE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 24 (TOGETHER WITH  
OTHERS SENT SEPTTEL). DINITZ SAID RABIN HAD WANTED HIM TO  
FLY TO ACAPULCO TO DELIVER THESE POINTS TO YOU PERSONALLY,  
BUT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO LEAVE THEM WITH LARRY TO PASS  
ALONG TO YOU. DINITZ ASKED THAT THEY BE FOR YOUR EYES  
ONLY, BUT LARRY THOUGHT YOU WOULD WANT MY COMMENTS ON THEM.  
WE WILL CONVEY ANY RESPONSE ONLY THROUGH LARRY, HOWEVER.  
BEGIN TEXT: POINTS FROM CONVERSATION WITH-P.M. TO BETRANS-  
MITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

(1) THE P.M. SEES THE SITUATION AS COMPLICATED AND IT IS  
DIFFICULT TO FORETELL INTO WHAT COMPLICATIONS IT MAY DRAG  
US. IT CAN BRING ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS THAT NONE OF US  
DESIRE AND WITHOUT ANYONE OF US INTENDING TO ARRIVE AT THEM.

(2) THE ISSUE IN QUESTION IS VERY PROBLEMATIC AND IT IS  
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THEREFORE OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT NO UNILATERAL ACTION BE

TAKEN AND NOTHING BE DONE IN A RUSH. THE P.M. WANTS TO BE SURE THAT THE SECRETARY IS FULLY AWARE OF THE GRAVITY OF THE MATTER AND HOW SERIOUS IT IS FOR US TO HAVE THE

SYRIANS CONTROL THE SOUTH, OR A RETURN TO THE SITUATION THAT EXISTED A YEAR AND A HALF AGO WITH REGARD TO THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

(3) THE MOST SERIOUS THING IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNILATERAL FACT WITH REGARD TO PENETRATION OF SYRIAN FORCES SOUTH OF THEIR PRESENT LINE. THERE ARE TERRORISTS THERE NOW AND THERE WERE TERRORISTS THERE BEFORE BUT THEIR PRESENCE AT THIS STAGE DOES NOT CREATE A NEW POLITICAL OR MILITARY FACT WHICH REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ACTION. THE MOST URGENT THING IS THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE A SYRIAN UNILATERAL ACT. THE OTHER THINGS CAN BE DISCUSSED AND NEGOTIATED IN DUE COURSE. IT IS THEREFORE OF THE HIGHEST AND FIRST PRIORITY TO PREVENT THE SYRIANS FROM MOVING SOUTH OF THEIR PRESENT LINE.

(4) THERE IS A GENUINE PROBLEM OF HOW TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION IN THE NEW POLITICAL REALITY WHEN EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO ACHIEVE A UNITED LEBANON AND THE SYRIANS ARE THE INSTRUMENT THROUGH WHICH IT IS TO BE ACHIEVED.

ONE OF THE POSSIBILITIES IS TO INCREASE AND BUILD THE EXISTING CHRISTIAN FORCE WHICH OPERATES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND IS PREFERABLE TO ANY OTHER FORCE. WE ALL MUST MAKE AN EFFORT TO BRING SARKIS TO RECOGNIZE THIS FORCE AND TO TAKE IT UNDER HIS AUSPICES (THE ATTACHED PAPER DESCRIBES THIS OPTION).

THE SECOND COURSE OF ACTION, THAT OF HAVING A SYRIAN FORCE IN NATABIYA OR TYRE, WILL REALLY NOT BY ITSELF PREVENT TERRORIST ACTIVITY. THE ONLY WAY IT CAN POSSIBLY BE CONSIDERED IS WHEN AGREEMENT IS REACHED BOTH WITH REGARD TO THE SYRIAN AND SARKIS ASSURANCES TO THE U.S., AS WELL AS AMERICAN ACQUIESCENCE TO ISRAEL'S FREEDOM OF ACTION IF THESE ASSURANCES ARE VIOLATED.

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UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE P.M. WANTS TO CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE BUT NOT, REPEAT NOT, WHILE THE SYRIANS TAKE A UNILATERAL ACTION BY ENTERING TYRE AND/OR NABATIYA. THE P.M. THEREFORE URGES THE SECRETARY TO ACT IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THAT THERE WILL BE NO ENTERING OF SYRIAN FORCES SOUTH OF THEIR PRESENT POSITION. THIS IS THE MOST SERIOUS

DEVELOPMENT AND THIS IS THE DEVELOPMENT THAT COULD BRING  
SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS.

(B) AFTERWARDS DISCUSSIONS CAN TAKE PLACE WITH REGARD TO  
THE STRENGTHENING OF THE CHRISTIAN FORCES IN THE SOUTH, AS

WELL AS THE SYRIAN ASSURANCES AND THE AMERICAN BACKING.  
ALL THIS CAN BE NEGOTIATED PEACEFULLY AND WITHOUT TENSION  
AS LONG AS THERE IS NO SYRIAN MOVEMENT TO THE SOUTH.

(5) THE P.M. WANTS TO IMPRESS UPON THE SECRETARY THE IM-  
PORTANCE OF HAVING A BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN US AND THE SYRIAN  
FORCES. WITHOUT SUCH A SEPARATION ZONE, ANY PROVOCATION  
BY THE TERRORISTS, AND THERE COULD ALWAYS BE SUCH PROVOCATION,  
WILL BRING ISRAEL INTO DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE  
SYRIANS. THIS IS A SITUATION THAT NONE OF US SHOULD BE  
INTERESTED IN.

(6) THE P.M. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT A SYRIAN FORCE IS  
NEEDED IN TYRE IN ORDER TO OPERATE THE PORT BECAUSE THERE  
IS THERE A LEBANESE NAVY WHICH IS QUITE CAPABLE OF DOING  
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PALESTINIANS IN TYRE OR NABATIYA TO THE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN  
FORCES THERE.

(7) IN CONCLUSION, THE P.M. SEES THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION  
AND A NECESSITY FOR AN ISRAELI MOVEMENT THAT MIGHT  
ARISE IN THE CONTEXT OF A SYRIAN MOVEMENT MORE THAN IN THE  
CONTEXT OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE P.M. SUGGESTS THAT  
THE SECRETARY SHOULD CALM THE SYRIANS, THAT THERE IS TIME  
FOR DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BEST POSSIBLE SOLUTION  
IN THE AREA, AS LONG AS NO UNILATERAL ACTION IS  
TAKEN ON THEIR PART. END TEXT.

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ROBINSON

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

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DRAFTED BY:NEA:ALATHERTONJR  
APPROVED BY:NEA:ALATHERTONJR  
S/S:O-LRMACFARLANE  
M:LSEABLEBURGER(SUBS)

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O 272205Z NOV 76 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 288840

NODIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 288840 SENT ACTION USDEL NOV 25.

QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 288840 TOSEC 310059

NODIS  
FOR SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

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(2) THE ISSUE IN QUESTION IS VERY PROBLEMATICAL AND IT IS THEREFORE OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT NO UNILATERAL ACTION BE TAKEN AND NOTHING BE DONE IN A RUSH. THE P.M. WANTS TO BE SURE THAT THE SECRETARY IS FULLY AWARE OF THE GRAVITY OF THE MATTER AND HOW SERIOUS IT IS FOR US TO HAVE THE

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(6) THE P.M. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT A SYRIAN FORCE IS NEEDED IN TYRE IN ORDER TO OPERATE THE PORT BECAUSE THERE IS THERE A LEBANESE NAVY WHICH IS QUITE CAPABLE OF DOING ALL THAT. THE P.M. PREFERS A LACK OF CONTROL OVER THE PALESTINIANS IN TYRE OR NABATIYA TO THE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN FORCES THERE.

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UNQUOTE ROBINSON

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TOSEC, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, TROOP DEPLOYMENT, PARAMILITARY FORCES, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, CAT-C  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 NOV 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
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**Drafter:** ALATHERTON, JR.  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X3  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 15 JUN 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
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Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

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**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PAPER ON SOUTHERN LEBANON  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, (RABIN, YITZHAK), (KISSINGER, HENRY A)  
**To:** SECRETARY  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006